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Abstract
We analyse the welfare eﬀects of environmental policy arising from the forma-
tion of an international environmental agreement on the participating and non-
participating countries and thus shed light on the potential incentives for a coun-
try to join such an agreement. Within a N -country Q-goods general equilib-
rium framework under free-trade conditions, we consider unilateral and cooper-
ative policy settings and, within the latter, country-speciﬁc and fully harmonized
policies within the agreement. A key result in the paper is the emergence of a neg-
ative relationship, arising from terms of trade eﬀects, between the welfare changes
of the participating and non-participating countries following the formation of the
agreement.
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1 Introduction
Climate change and the trans-boundary nature of environmental pollutants have drawn
the attention of academics and policymakers to the interaction between international
trade and the environment and to the importance of internationally coordinated actions
in addressing environmental concerns. Since the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment in 1972, environmental policy eﬀorts globally have been geared
towards ﬁnding potential solutions in a multilateral context  through international
(IEA) or regional environmental agreements (REA).1
The extant theoretical literature suggests that countries may not be willing to re-
strict environmental policy in order to avoid free-riding behaviour and/or  as reﬂected
by the pollution haven hypothesis  due to fears of a loss of competitiveness. A key
rationale behind environmental agreements and coordinated actions is to limit such
free-riding incentives (Baylis et al., 2014; Chua, 2003).Against this background, it is
important to shed light on the potential channels that may incentivise countries to join
an environmental agreement.
In this paper, we conjecture that, by aﬀecting the terms of trade, environmental
policy can give rise to trade creation and diversion eﬀects that will shape the welfare im-
plications of, and the incentives to join, international environmental agreements for the
participating and non-participating countries. To explore this conjecture, we develop a
N -country Q-goods perfectly competitive general equilibrium international trade model
1The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (www.unep.org) deﬁnes Multilateral En-
vironmental Agreements (MEAs) as international agreements between three or more countries (agree-
ments between two countries are referred to as bilateral agreements) on how to jointly address en-
vironmental problems of a cross-border nature. Mitchell (2003) surveys multilateral and bilateral
environmental agreements to number approximately 700 and over 1000, respectively. Similarly, ac-
cording to the IEA database (http://iea.uoregon.edu/) there are 1280 MEAs and over 2100 bilateral
agreements. The likely relatively higher homogeneity and the lower enforcement and coordination costs
characterising smaller regions may explain the greater ease in forming smaller regional as opposed to
larger environmental agreements.
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in which a subset of countries form an environmental agreement.2 We assume pollution
to be trans-boundary and arising from production activities and that governments can
aﬀect environmental quality by means of an emissions tax. The assumption of free-
trade, consistent with WTO objectives, facilitates a clearer identiﬁcation of the various
welfare eﬀects emerging solely from environmental policy.
Our results conﬁrm that an important channel for the welfare impact of environ-
mental agreements are terms-of-trade induced trade creation and diversion eﬀects. A
major contribution of the paper is to show that terms of trade eﬀects are crucial to the
emergence of a negative relationship between the changes in welfare of signatories and
non-signatories countries  whereby a Pareto welfare improving policy reform for the
former may be welfare reducing for the latter. Thus, our results suggest that countries
participating in an IEA may be able to use their environmental policies to manipulate
the terms of trade so as to mitigate the negative impact of stricter emission control
on competitiveness that underpins the pollution haven eﬀects of environmental policy
commonly highlighted by the literature.
The literature addressing environmental policy coordination mainly deals with the
characterisation of optimal (ﬁrst and second best) environmental and/or trade policy
(see, e.g., Copeland, 1994; Neary, 2006; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2014; Tsakiris et al.,
2014) and policy reforms (Turunen-Red and Woodland, 2004; Copeland, 1994). The
welfare consequences of policy reforms have mainly been analysed within a purely unilat-
eral (e.g. Markusen, 1975; Krutilla, 1991; Copeland, 1994; Hatzipanayotou et al., 2008;
Michael and Hatzipanayotou, 2013; Tsakiris et al., 2014, 2017) or a fully-cooperative
(e.g. Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2014; Kotsogiannis and Woodland, 2013; Vlassis, 2013)
context. To the best of our knowledge, the case of partial cooperation among a subset
of countries has not been studied within this framework.
2Here we are not concerned with the issue of coalition formation and stability (Finus, 2003).
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Alongside the trade theoretic approach within which this paper is developed, a
game theoretic approach has primarily focused on environmental agreements' beha-
viour  from their formation, to participation incentives, and to factors contributing
to their eﬀectiveness (for recent reviews of this literature see, among others, Finus and
Capparros, 2015 and Marrouch and Chaudhuri, 2016).3 More recently, Al Khourdajie
and Finus (2018) focus on the role of trade instruments, in the form of BCA, in oﬀset-
ting countries' incentives to free ride in an IEA. In line with our results, this strand of
the literature implies that terms of trade eﬀects can potentially incentivise countries to
join an IEA. While the game theory approach can study IEA behavioural aspects in a
partially cooperative framework, it does not capture general equilibrium eﬀects and is
limited in its ability to characterise optimal policies and reforms.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the model, whilst
Section 3 derives, as a benchmark, the optimal unilateral and cooperative policies in
the absence of an international environmental agreement. Section 4 derives and dis-
cusses the optimal (country-speciﬁc and fully harmonized) environmental policy for the
signatories. Section 5 determines the relationship between the welfare changes of the
participating and non-participating countires. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We adopt a standard perfectly competitive general equilibrium international trade
model characterised by N large open economies each producing and trading Q goods
3Papers focusing on issues of enforcement and on the size of IEAs (Hoel, 1992; Barrett, 1994;
Eichner and Pethig, 2013) tend towards a pessimistic outlook about the stability of large IEAs. When
IEA games include environmental or trade policy options (e.g., Eichner and Pethig, 2015; Dong and
Zhao, 2009; Finus and Rundshagen, 2000), the results regarding participation and cooperation are
mixed. In addition, there is a signiﬁcant portion of the game theory literature that highlights the role
of trade sanctions in increasing the stability of cooperation among countries (e.g., Hoel and Schneider,
1997; Carraro et al., 2006; Barrett, 1995, 1997).
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under conditions of free-trade.4 Pollution emissions are a by-product of production and
are assumed to aﬀect the representative consumer's welfare directly, whilst having no
eﬀect on the production capabilities of ﬁrms.5 Factors of production are assumed to be
internationally immobile and inelastically supplied. In what follows, superscripts and
subscripts refer to the country and partial derivatives, respectively.
The vector of world prices is denoted by p and country j's Q-dimensional vector
of emissions is denoted by zj. Pollution is assumed to be fully trans-boundary; thus,
global pollution is the sum of all countries' emissions:6
k =
N∑
j=1
i′zj , (2.1)
where i represents the N -vector of 1s and the prime indicates transposition.
Country j's consumer preferences are described by the expenditure function:
ej(uj, p, k) = minxj{p′xj : U j(xj, k) ≥ uj} , (2.2)
which represents the minimum cost of achieving the utility level U j given international
prices p and aggregate pollution level k. Utility depends positively on consumption x
and negatively on emissions k. The expenditure function is concave and linear homo-
geneous in prices and is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable. By Shephard's
Lemma, the Hicksian compensated demand vector is represented by ejp and the con-
sumer's marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement is given by ejk. An increase
4The basic framework of analysis relies on that developed by Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004)
and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014). Our focus diﬀers in that we consider partial cooperation, among
a subset of countries, instead of full cooperation and we do not impose any restriction on trade  in
line with WTO objectives (GATT article I and II). This allows us to analyse and isolate the eﬀects
of international environmental agreements on the welfare of both participating and non-participating
countries.
5See Copeland (1994) and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014).
6The analysis can easily be generalised to the case of partially trans-boundary pollution.
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in the level of any pollutant would require an increase in consumption to compensate
the consumer for the disutility from pollution; thus, expenditure is increasing in k,
implying ejk > 0.
Each country imposes sector speciﬁc emission taxes, denoted by the vector sj. In
each sector, ﬁrms maximise revenue by choosing a feasible combination of emission (zj)
and output (yj) for a given technology tj and vector of endowments (vj), resulting in
the revenue function:
gj(p, sj, vj) = Maxy,z{p′yj − sj′zj : yj, zjtj(vj)} . (2.3)
The revenue function is convex, homogeneous of degree one in prices and emission taxes
and is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable.7 Hotelling's Lemma implies
that the price derivatives of the revenue function give the vector of the net supplies of
tradable goods yj = gjp. The envelope property also implies that z
j = −gjs, i.e. the
vector of emissions equals the marginal abatement costs.8 Thus, totally diﬀerentiating
zj, we obtain the eﬀect of the environmental policy on emission:
dzj = −(gjssdsj + gjspdpj) , (2.4)
where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand-side represents the direct eﬀect of the policy and
the second term reﬂects the indirect eﬀect arising from the impact of changes in prices
on production. Thus, the change in global pollution is given by:
dk = −
N∑
j=1
i′(gjssds
j + gjspdp) = −
N∑
j=1
(i′gjssds
j)−
N∑
j=1
(i′gjspdp) . (2.5)
7For the properties of the revenue function see Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982) and
Copeland (1994).
8This, in turn, implies that global pollution can be rewritten as k = −
N∑
j=1
i′gjs.
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It is assumed that the emission tax revenues are returned to the consumer in a lump-sum
fashion. Thus, the economy's aggregate budget constraint is given by:
ej(uj, p, k) = gj(p, sj) + sj′zj . (2.6)
The market clearing condition requires that the sum of excess demands across the world
should be equal to zero:
N∑
j=1
mj =
N∑
j=1
{ejp − gjp} = 0 . (2.7)
Equations (2.1), (2.6), and (2.7) characterize the economy's equilibrium.9
3 Optimal Environmental Policy in the Absence of an
International Environmental Agreement
In this section, we analyse environmental policy when the emission taxes are set uni-
laterally or in a fully multilateral cooperative setting. Although the results are well
established in the literature,10 they will oﬀer a useful benchmark for the analysis of
international environmental agreements.
By diﬀerentiating the market clearing condition (2.7), using (2.5), we can identify
the eﬀect of the environmental policy on international prices.11
Λdp =
N∑
j=1
{[
gj′ps +
(
N∑
j=1
ejpk
)
i′gjss
]
dsj
}
, (3.1)
9The ﬁrst tradable good is assumed to be the numeraire.
10See, e.g., Markusen, 1975; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2014; Tsakiris et al., 2014, 2017; Vlassis, 2013;
Kotsogiannis and Woodland, 2013.
11Each country's income eﬀects are attached only to the numeraire good ejpu = 0. Relaxation of this
assumption is feasible, without altering the qualitative nature of the results.
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where
Λ =
N∑
j=1
[
ej′pp − gj′pp −
(
N∑
j=1
ejpk
)
i′gjsp
]
, (3.2)
is the pollution augmented world net substitution matrix which is assumed to be of full
rank and invertible. Thus:
dp = Λ−1
N∑
j=1
{[
gj′ps +
(
N∑
j=1
ejpk
)
i′gjss
]
dsj
}
, (3.3)
which reﬂects the fact that changes in environmental policy aﬀect prices via changes in
both production levels,
(
gj′psds
j
)
, and, given the latter's eﬀect on pollution, consumption
levels,
((∑N
j=1 e
j
pk
)
i′gjssds
)
.
To evaluate the impact of the environmental policy on welfare, we totally diﬀeren-
tiate the budget constraint in (2.6) to obtain
ejudu
j =
[
−mj′ − sj′gjsp + ejk
(
N∑
j=1
i′gjsp
)]
dp− sj′gjssdsj + ejk
N∑
j=1
(
i′gjssds
j
)
. (3.4)
Equation (3.4), indicates that an environmental policy change aﬀects a country's welfare
via its eﬀects on: global pollution,
(
ejk
∑N
j=1 (i
′gjssds
j)
)
, government revenue (sj′gjssds
j),
and prices  where the latter in turn aﬀect the terms of trade ((−mj) dp), government
revenue
(−sj′gjspdp) and global pollution (ejk (∑Nj=1 i′gjsp)).
In order to derive the optimal non-cooperative environmental policy, we substitute
(3.3) into (3.4) to rewrite the changes in the welfare function as
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ejudu
j =
−mj
N∑
j=1
(µjdsj)
−sj′gjsp
N∑
j=1
(µjdsj)− sj′gjssdsj
+ejk
N∑
j=1
{[
i′gjss + i
′gjsp
N∑
j=1
µj
]
dsj
}
,
(3.5)
where
µj = Λ−1
[
gjps +
(
N∑
j=1
ejpk
)
i′gjss
]
,
from which the optimal unilateral environmental policy is
sj′ = ejki
′ − Ωj (3.6)
where Ωj =
[
mj − ejk
(
N∑
l=1,l 6=j
glsp
)]
µj
(
gjss + g
j
spµ
j
)−1
. Consistent with Keen and Kot-
sogiannis (2014), Tsakiris et al., (2014) and Markusen (1975), the optimal unilateral
emission taxes account for the diﬀerence between the consumer's marginal willingness
to pay for pollution abatement, ejki
′, and the impact of policy induced price changes
on the terms of trade mj and global emissions ejk
(
N∑
j=1
i′gjsp
)
. A key diﬀerence with
the extant literature is that, due to the fact that there is only one available policy
instrument to address two distortions, the terms of trade and emission leakage eﬀects
are weighted by the direct eﬀect of the policy on emission levels gjss and its indirect
eﬀect through prices gjsp.
12
In order to determine the cooperative optimal policy, we use the market clearing
12Our result is also consistent with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium carbon permit price ob-
tained by Copeland (1994) which equals the marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement to
an indirect terms of trade eﬀect. Again, the key diﬀerence is the term reﬂecting the impact of policy
induced price changes on global emissions which arises in our model as a result of the absence of trade
policy to target trade related distortions. See Markusen (1975) for a discussion of corrective taxation
in the case of a single policy instrument to deal with several distortions simultaneously.
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condition in (2.7) together with the sum of the individual countries' welfare to write
the change in world welfare as:13
N∑
j=1
ejudu
j=
N∑
j=1
{[(
N∑
j=1
ejki
′
)
− sj′
]
δj
}
, (3.7)
where δj =
[
gjss + g
j
sp
N∑
j=1
µj
]
dsj. For δ 6= 0 , the optimal cooperative environmental
tax is then:
scoop =
(
N∑
j=1
ejki
)
. (3.8)
Equation (3.8) implies that the cooperative second best optimal environmental
policy should be uniform across the countries and equal to the cumulative (global)
marginal damage caused by an additional unit of emission. Since the marginal dam-
age from emissions is the same irrespective of the sector and country that generate
them, each country sets the same emission tax across all the sectors, fully internalising
the externality. This result is consistent with the related literature (e.g. Keen and
Kotsogiannis, 2014; Kotsogiannis and Woodland, 2013; Vlassis, 2013).
Against this background, we now proceed to examine environmental policy within
international environmental agreements.
4 Optimal Environmental Policy within an Interna-
tional Environmental Agreement
Assuming that a subset of countries sign an environmental agreement, we now determ-
ine the optimal environmental policy for the participating and the non-participating
countries, denoted by the superscripts h and f respectively.
13Implicitly, behind this is the existence of lump sum transfers between countries with the welfare
of each country being equally weighted.
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While the welfare of the non-participating countries and their optimal environmental
policy are as described by equations (3.5) and (3.6), the policy induced changes in the
aggregate welfare of the participating countries are given by:
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehudu
h =
N∑
h=1,h6=f
{
(−mh)
N∑
j=1
(µjdsj)
}
−
N∑
h=1,h6=f
{
sh′
(
ghssds
h + ghsp
N∑
j=1
(µjdsj)
)}
+
N∑
h=1,h6=f
{
ehki
′
N∑
j=1
{(
gjss + g
j
sp
N∑
j=1
µj
)
dsj
}}
,
(4.1)
where the terms on the right-hand-side reﬂect, respectively, the change in the particip-
ating members' terms of trade, the impact of policy on their own emissions (directly
and through production changes), and the cumulative impact of the policy on world
emission leakage weighted by the participating countries marginal willingness to pay
for pollution abatement.
If the environmental agreement results in country-speciﬁc taxes, the optimal tax sh
∗
for the typical participating country h will be :
sh
∗
=
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehki
′ − Φ (4.2)
where Φ =

 N∑
h=1,h6=f
mh
+
 N∑
h=1,h6=h∗,f
shghsp
−
 N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehk i
′
 N∑
j=1,j 6=h∗
gjsp
µh∗ (gh∗ss + gh∗sp µh∗)−1.
Proposition 1. In the presence of an international environmental agreement, the
second best country-speciﬁc optimal environmental policy for the participating coun-
tries will reﬂect their consumers' marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement,
their terms of trade eﬀects, as well as the pollution externalities arising from the change
in production in both participating and non-participating countries.
Intuitively, maximisation of the joint welfare of the participating countries implies
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that for each one the environmental tax should reﬂect the diﬀerence between the union's
marginal damage from emissions and the country-speciﬁc eﬀects of the tax on terms of
trade and emission leakages. Speciﬁcally, the term
(
N∑
h=1,h 6=f
mh
)
reﬂects the policy's
eﬀect on the participating countries' terms of trade. The term
(
N∑
h=1,h 6=h∗,f
shghsp
)
cap-
tures the internalisation of the policy externalities between the participating countries.
This term has an interesting policy implication, which suggests that, as a result of
the policy externality, a strict environmental policy by one member is compatible with
'softer' environmental standards in other participating countries. Finally, the term(
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehki
′
)(
N∑
j=1,j 6=h∗
gjsp
)
reﬂects the internalisation of the price and, consequently,
production externalities arising from all other countries. The discrepancy between the
participating countries' country-speciﬁc taxes reﬂects the inter-country diﬀerences in
the direct and indirect impact (through changes in prices and production) of the tax
on a country's emissions, µh
∗ (
gh
∗
ss + g
h∗
spµ
h∗
)−1
. This highlights even further the fact
that participating countries can set diﬀerent levels of environmental taxes to address
common targets whilst accommodating for country speciﬁc characteristics  as is, for
example, the case within the European Union where all countries participate in the EU
Emissions Trading System whilst having country speciﬁc environmental policy/targets.
If policy coordination results in full perfect tax harmonization within the signatories,
the optimal tax will be given by:
sh
∗
=
N∑
h=1,h 6=f
ehki
′ − Ψ (4.3)
where Ψ =
 N∑
h=1,h6=f
mh
−
 N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehk i
′
 N∑
f=1,f 6=h
gfsp
(µh∗)
 N∑
h=1,h6=f
(
ghss + g
h
spµ
h
)−1. As is clear
from (4.3), the uniform tax depends on the participating countries' marginal willingness
to pay
 N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehki
′
, their terms of trade eﬀects
(
N∑
h=1,h6=f
mh
)
, and the externality of the
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non-participating countries weighted by the participating countries marginal damage(
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehki
′
)(
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
gfsp
)
.
The diﬀerences between the optimal unilateral policy in equation (3.6) and the mul-
tilateral policies in equations (3.8), (4.2) and (4.3) reﬂect the fact that, contrary to the
former, multilateral policies do not simply take into account a country's own consumer
marginal damage from emissions, but also internalise the damage to the consumers of
all the countries participating in the agreement. However, whilst in the multilateral
case full coordination results in the internalisation of all the externalities, the policy
coordination between members of an environmental agreement only internalises the ex-
ternalities among member countries. Comparison between (4.2) and (4.3) suggests that
the diﬀerence in the optimal tax between the two coordination modes among particip-
ating countries rests on the fact that the optimal country-speciﬁc environmental tax
does not only internalise the intra-agreement externalities but also takes into account
country-speciﬁc characteristics.
Given that in the case of full multilateral cooperation analysed in Section 3, the
cumulative impact of the externality has been fully internalised, there are no distribu-
tional eﬀects across countries through the terms-of-trade channel. Instead, as is the
case for unilateral environmental policies, partial multilateral cooperation aﬀects the
terms-of-trade, stimulating trade creation and trade diversion eﬀects. These terms of
trade eﬀects may generate incentives or disincentives for some countries to join an en-
vironmental agreement, or adopt environmental policies, when trade policy instruments
are not available to correct the terms-of-trade distortion. Similarly, in the case of par-
tial cooperation, the optimal environmental policy takes into account the direct impact
of the policy on the IEA participants' emissions as well as on the emissions resulting
from changes in production in the rest of the world.
Although the eﬀects of the diﬀerent policy scenarios on welfare levels are not easy to
13
quantify within this framework, given its higher degree of internalisation of the policy
externalities, the multilateral setting ought to be dominating from a welfare point of
view.14 However, in reality, we observe the prevalence of REAs. This may reﬂect
the higher complexity of global coordination arising, for instance, from the conﬂict of
interest among many and very heterogeneous countries. Clearly, however, the size of the
agreement plays an important role in determining the level of the optimal environmental
tax as it aﬀects the cumulative marginal damage and the terms of trade eﬀects. It
also magniﬁes the externalities arising from the non-participating countries' production
distortions. Whether an increase in the number of participating countries results in an
increase in the optimal emission tax level will depend on the balance of those eﬀects.
5 Welfare Eﬀects of an IEA on Participating and Non-
Participating Countries
In this section, we examine the welfare eﬀects of an IEA's changes in policy on parti-
cipating and non-participating countries.
Rewriting the market clearing condition in equation (2.7) as:
−
N∑
h=1,h6=f
mh =
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
mf , (5.1)
14Tsakiris at al.(2017) analyse the issue of eﬃciency of the non-cooperative versus the cooperative
equilibrium of environmental policy, in a two country model with capital mobility. They conclude that
in the presence of cross-border pollution, the non-cooperative settings of the available instruments is
always ineﬃcient relative to the cooperative ones.
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and combining it with equations (4.1) and (3.5), we obtain
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehudu
h =
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
{
−efuduf
}
+
N∑
j=1
{(∑N
j=1 e
j
ki
′ − sj′
)(
gjssds
j + gjsp
N∑
j=1
µjdsj
)} . (5.2)
To isolate the eﬀects of the participating countries' policy changes, we assume that the
non-participating countries are passive; equation (5.2) then becomes
N∑
h=1,h 6=f
ehudu
h =
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
{
−efuduf
}
+
N∑
h=1,h6=f
{(
N∑
j=1
ejki
′ − sh′
)(
ghssds
h + ghsp
N∑
h=1,h 6=f
µhdsh
)}
+
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
{(
N∑
j=1
ejki
′ − sf ′
)(
gfsp
N∑
h=1,h 6=f
µhdsh
)} , (5.3)
while the change in the welfare of a non-participating country is given by:
efudu
f =
−mf
N∑
h=1,h6=f
(
µhdsh
)
(
efki
′ − sf ′
)
gfsp
N∑
h=1,h6=f
(
µhdsh
)
+efki
′
N∑
h=1,h6=f
[
ghssds
h +
(
N∑
j=1,j 6=f
gjsp
)
µhdsh
]
.
(5.4)
Equation (5.3) states that a change in the participating countries' environmental
policy will aﬀect their aggregate welfare through terms of trade (via changes in inter-
national prices) and emission leakage eﬀects. As can be seen from the ﬁrst term on
the right-hand-side of the equation, there is a negative relationship between the change
in welfare of participating and non-participating countries. This negative relationship
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hinges on the opposite terms of trade eﬀects that the environmental agreement's policy
has on participating and non-participating countries.15 Clearly, these eﬀects could not
be highlighted by the existing trade/environmental literature, which has only considered
the case of full cooperation within global environmental agreements.
Proposition 2. There exists a negative relationship, arising from the terms of trade
eﬀects of the IEA's policy, between the participating and the non-participating countries'
change in welfare.
Changes in the signatories' environmental policy will also generate emission leakage
among non-signatories. Speciﬁcally, the second term on the right-hand-side of (5.3)
captures the participating countries' environmental policy's direct and indirect impact
on their production, weighted by the diﬀerence between their emission taxes and the
cumulative world marginal damage (which corresponds to the optimal tax of the full
multilateral cooperative case). The last term on the right-hand-side of equation (5.3)
captures the inter-bloc emission leakage eﬀects of the policy resulting from its eﬀects
on international prices and production in non-participating countries, weighted by the
diﬀerence between of the non-participating countries environmental tax and its full
multilateral optimal level.
Equation (5.4) states that the change in the participating countries' emission taxes
will aﬀect the welfare of the non-participating ones through their impact on terms of
trade as well as their intra- and inter-bloc emission leakage eﬀects. The policy's terms
of trade eﬀect on a non-participating country will be determined by the country's initial
trade status. The weights attached to the leakage eﬀects reﬂect the marginal damage
to the country's consumers and its diﬀerence to the country's emission tax. The over-
all eﬀect to the welfare of a non-participating country resulting from a change in the
15To see this, isolate the terms of trade eﬀects in equation (5.4) and substitute them for all the non-
participating countries in (5.1). Using the resulting function, substitute the particpating countries'
terms of trade in (4.1) to get (5.3).
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emission taxes of the participating countries in an IEA will be determined by the mag-
nitude of the described eﬀects. However,equation (5.3) implies that an environmental
policy reform that is Pareto improving for the IEA participating countries can reduce
the level of welfare in the non-participating countries due to the trade creation and
trade diversion eﬀects of the policy. This result suggests that the terms-of-trade eﬀects
of environmental policy are an important channel aﬀecting the incentives of countries
to join an environmental agreement.
In order to isolate the eﬀects of the policy on the terms of trade and to characterize
a welfare improving reform, we follow Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) and consider a
special case by imposing some restrictive assumptions on the model. Speciﬁcally we
set: epk = 0, epp = 0 and assume that one unit of production generates α units of
emission, i.e. gp = −αgs. We also assume that, at the initial equilibrium, sj = 0 and,
as before, that the non-participating countries are not policy active. In this case, the
policy has an eﬀect only through the terms of trade channel as is clear from the following
equation:
N∑
h=1,h 6=f
ehudu
h = −
 N∑
f=1,f 6=h
mf
′ N∑
j=1
gjpp
−1 N∑
h=1,h 6=f
ghssds
h
 . (5.5)
Given the above assumptions, substitution of equations (3.5) and (5.1) into (5.5) yields:
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehudu
h = −
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
efuduf .
Then, a Pareto improving reform for the IEA's members is one such as dsh = −κ
N∑
f=1,f 6=h
mf
with κ being a positive scalar, which implies
N∑
h=1,h6=f
ehudu
h = κ
 N∑
f=M+1
mf
′ N∑
j=1
gjpp
−1 N∑
h=1,h6=f
ghss
 N∑
f=M+1
mf
 > 0 ,
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since gpp and gss are positive deﬁnite. Such a policy decreases the total trade with
the non-participating countries and, as a result, has a negative eﬀect on the non-
participating countries' aggregate welfare.
The implications of this section can be summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 3. A Pareto improving environmental policy reform for the countries
participating in an IEA can have a negative eﬀect on the welfare of the non-participating
countries due to its impact on the terms of trade.
Intuitively, proposition 3 suggests that countries participating in an IEA can manipulate
their terms of trade using their environmental policy resulting in trade creation among
themselves and trade diversion with the rest of the world. This result implies that the
terms of trade channel can weaken the pollution haven eﬀect (whereby participation in
an IEA can lead to a loss of competitive advantage in the regulated sector). Instead,
due to the trade creation and diversion eﬀects of the policy, countries can be worse oﬀ
if not participating in an IEA. This result is in line with that of Al Khourdajie and
Finus (2018) who show, in a game theoretic setup, that the manipulation of the terms
of trade can lead to the formation of larger stable environmental agreements. This line
of argument can contribute to explain the discrepancy (e.g. as highlighted by Marrouch
and Chaudhuri, 2016) between the optimal size of environmental agreements predicted
by the standard game theoretic literature and the much larger size observed in reality
as with the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015) which signed by 37
and 196 countries, respectively.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a N -country Q-goods general equilibrium framework to ana-
lyse unilateral and cooperative optimal environmental policies within an environmental
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agreement. The analysis highlights the importance of the terms of trade, via trade
creation and trade diversion eﬀects, for the characterisation of the optimal environ-
mental policy and its welfare eﬀects on participating and non-participating countries.
The potential gains from increased trade may oﬀset the increased costs of higher en-
vironmental taxes within an agreement. Another point to consider, which we have not
explored in this paper, is that the trade creation and trade diversion eﬀects of the IEA
will aﬀect global pollution. It is therefore theoretically possible that even when result-
ing in a global increase in welfare, an IEA may lead to an overall increase in pollution,
depending on the production structure and relative pollution intensity of participating
and non-participating countries.
A key ﬁnding of this paper is the negative relationship between the welfare changes
of the participating and that of the non-participating countries arising from the terms
of trade eﬀects of the environmental policy. An interesting implication of the analysis is
that countries may be willing to participate in an IEA as the terms of trade channel can
contribute to mitigate the typical loss of comparative advantage resulting from stricter
environmental regulation.
Whilst our analysis contributes to explain the nature of the externalities resulting
from the formation of an environmental agreement, it does not allow us to quantify the
exact welfare eﬀects of the policy. This would require adopting a less general framework
of analysis which we leave for future research.
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